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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 12/08/2016

Accident number: 803

Accident time: 10:10

Accident Date: 03/11/2008

Where it occurred: TS TM 31 Bavarni Tor
- MF 3 Khumroghi Tor,
Vanj District,
Panjshanbeobod
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Tajikistan

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 08/11/2008
Name of source: TNMAC

ID original source:
Organisation: [Name removed]

Ground condition: grass/grazing area;
hard; steep slope

Mine/device:

Date last modified: 12/08/2016

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: E 071° 21’ 08.87”

Map north: N38° 16’ 55.29”

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
inadequate training (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
request for long handtool (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
This report was made available as scattered files, the longest of which is awaiting translation
from Tajik to English. The report will be adjusted when that has been achieved. Text from the
other files has been merged into the following. Some of the formatting and pictures have
been removed. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in
square brackets [ ] is editorial.
Internal Demining group accident report
On the day of the mine accident, six MDD teams were deployed and controlled by three Set
Leaders and [Victim No.2] as MDC Supervisor. Due to the entire task setup, three MDDs
worked in one Set on two different spots of the minefield 31/3.
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One MDD Set was responsible to prepare a 2m wide safety lane surrounding of the PFM 1S
contaminated drop zone. The second Set made a 2m wide cross through the minefield for a
better access for the ops. teams. Both Sets were approx 250m away from each. Therefore,
the safety distance was guarantied.”
During the field Ops. November 3rd and till the time of the accident, 2700 meters square been
reduced by MDDs and 136 PFM 1S were indicated.
Regarding the practical experience, such mines were always safety collected from the
minefields and passed into collection pit. So, happened as well on the day of the accident.
[Victim No.1], Set Leader, collected the indicated mines from his Set area to the collecting pit
approx 30m away from the field Ops. When he lies down the last PFM, the explosion
happened. Fortunately, [Victim No.1] was during the blast of the mine not in the squat but in
the right up position.
[Victim No.2] was during this action about 1,5m on the left side behind [Victim No.1]. Because
of the distance to and the position to the mine blast, both of them became slightly and
treatable injured.
[Victim No.2] did not wear a visor. He ignored the safety regulations of [Demining group] and
was as a supervisor a negative example for the whole de-mining team. Therefore, [Victim
No.2] received a written warning.
The spring of the striker removed from Victim No.1’s right calf by the surgeon.
Recommendation for the further handling of PFM mines
The PFM mines where the thicker wing been destructed and the liquid explosive is obviously
out, those PFM mines should be collected and pass in a proofed pit store until the demo. The
transport of those mines just on the thin wing and careful the metal part in the mid of the mine
is the fuse system and contains a few g explosive too.
PFM mines where the thicker wing (explosive contained) is still in a proper shape, shall be
marked of and destruct in situ take place. Don’t touch those mines or move!!!!
If MDD operation is going on in the certain minefields, the destruction of those “healthy” PFM
mines take place Later, by the end of the Ops. day. Or by using special devices (tyres etc.) to
avoid they add contamination of the area.
Note: JUST BY AN EOD QUALIFIED PERSON OF [Demining group].
Or using a tool Like a box with a long handle which is on the opposite of the de-miner open,
so the mine could push into that box for a safety handling.
Investigation by the MAC
[The report has not been translated yet and the following is gathered from those parts in
English and from the photographs included.]
The accident occurred in a hazardous area high in the mountains. The demining group
involved was searching the area with two mine dog teams and collecting discovered devices,
moving them to a collection area. When the field supervisors went to count the discovered
mines, the last collected item exploded, resulting in minor injuries to both supervisors.
The area was contaminated with aerially scattered PFM mines.
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The picture shows the site of the accident. Collected PFM mines and collected scrap (largely
from the dispenser) have been collected in an unmarked area that has not been prepared.
The munitions have not been placed in an orderly way.

This picture shows what the area looked like before and after the investigation.
According to the International Supervisor’s statement [Victim No.2], two supervisors went to
the collection area to count the collected mines and the detonation occurred. Victim No.1 was
counting and may have been obliged to move the heap to count accurately. Victim No.2 was
1.5 metres away (without face protection) when the detonation occurred. According the
demining group’s internal report above, [Victim No.1] was placing the mine in the collection
area when it detonated.
Victim No 1 was a Mine Dog set leader. Victim No.2 was an International Supervisor.
The accident occurred at 10:10 (or 10:15 depending on source). Victim No.2 stopped
operations and called for Victim No.1 (with a serious injury to his leg) to be helped to the
ambulance.
Photographs show that the injuries were to the front and side of the victims and marks on
their frontal body armour show that the armour protected them against multiple small
fragment strikes. No pictures of Victim No.1’s visor were included and it is presumed that he
was wearing it because his failure to do so is not noted.
Evacuation required transit down a steep zig-zag mountain track before reaching the
ambulance.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 999

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 65 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Summary of injuries: severe Leg
COMMENT: Photograph showed a large injury to the right leg with minor injury above. No
medical report currently available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 1000

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 65 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal visor; Long
apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries: minor Face, minor Legs
COMMENT: Photographs showed more than a dozen light injuries to legs and injuries above,
below and beside the right eye. No medical report currently available.

Statements
Dated 03/11/08 by Victim No.2, field supervisor. [Handwritten in English.]
I woke up at 05:30 a.m. in the morning. We had breakfast at 06:15. We left the camp at 06:30
together with all MDD staff. We arrived to the top of the minefield at 07:15 a.m. We had fifteen
minutes break. After break [Victim No.1] made safety briefing to all. Then the ops started at
07:30. I supervised both sections from the safe place located in the middle of both sections.
The ops was going on normally in the field. But the area has spiky grass as well. [Victim No.1]
told me he said we collected PFM mines from the field, I need to count them. The time was
10:10 a.m. [Victim No.1] started counting them. I went nearby. I was 1.5 metres away from
the place where the mines were stored. Total number of mines were 46. The last mine blast in
its place at 10:15 a.m. I injured under right eye and both legs as well. All the injuries were
slight. Then I stop the ops and call to the deminers and dogs handlers to stop ops and help
[Victim No.1] to bring him to ambulance. I came by myself to the ambulance and doctor took
us to Vanj Hospital. We arrived at 11:15 a.m.
As conclusion. When we arrived to hospital we had x-ray. After x-ray there was no problem
and we got treatment in local hospital of Vanj. At the moment our health is good.
Signed: [Victim No.2] Field supervisor
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management Control Inadequacy” because
the senior international supervisor present had not ensured that the mine collection area was
appropriately prepared and marked and was not wearing PPE correctly. The management
who had appointed him had not ensured that he knew or would enforce the demining group’s
own SOPs and basic safety standards. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”
because it seems that both supervisors did not understand the dangers of piling live mines in
an untidy collection area. It is surprising that only one mine detonated, and it was lucky that
Victim No.2 was not struck in the eye by the fragments that struck his face.
The information currently available is internally contradictory. Victim No.2 stated that he was
watching as Victim No.1 counted mines. The Internal demining group report states that Victim
No.1 was delivering a mine to the pit while Victim No.2 stood by. It is possible that he was
both delivering a mine and counting those already collected. Photographs showing an untidy
pile of mines that needed to be counted imply that Victim No.1 may have been levelling or
moving the mines to count them (perhaps using a stick) when the accident occurred.
Alternatively he may have been delivering another mine but the lack of injury to his hands
implies that they were not in the direct vicinity of the blast, so he may have thrown it onto the
pile.
The mine was identified (from others in the same dispersal) as a PFM 1S, which is supposed
to self-destruct after a set period (reported to be 40 hours). That mechanism did not work but
after “gagging” it may be especially sensitive to any movement (rather than the pressure that
is usually required to squeeze the liquid explosive and initiate the firing mechanism). In any
case, the number of live mines collected implies that the self-destruct feature is very
unreliable.
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